



RENEWABLE HEAT
INCENTIVE INQUIRY

WIT-161064

RHI Inquiry

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Aidan McAteer

Sinn Féin

Connolly House

147 Andersonstown Road

BELFAST

BT11 9BW

By email to: padraig@omuirighsolicitors.com

12 November 2018

Dear Sir,

Re: The Independent Public Inquiry into the Non Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) Scheme

Provision of a Section 21 Notice requiring the provision of evidence in the form of a written statement

I am writing to you in my capacity as Solicitor to the Independent Public Inquiry into the Non Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) Scheme (known as 'the RHI Inquiry') which has been set up under the Inquiries Act 2005 ('the Act').

I know that you are familiar with the work of the Inquiry and its Terms of Reference from your previous engagement with it and the Inquiry remains grateful for the witness statements and documents you have already provided.

As you may be aware, the Inquiry continues to seek some further written evidence from witnesses and participants, particularly where issues have arisen in evidence recently provided in respect of which it is necessary, or appropriate, to provide an opportunity for further response. The Inquiry Chairman also retains the right to

Chairman: Rt Hon Sir Patrick Coghlin | Secretary: Andrew Browne | Solicitor: Patrick Butler

require witnesses to attend to provide (further) oral evidence, and consideration will be given to whether that is necessary in light of additional written evidence which is received.

In the circumstances, please find enclosed with this letter a further Section 21 Notice requiring you to provide evidence to the RHI Inquiry Panel in the form of a further written statement addressing the matters identified in the Schedule to the Section 21 Notice.

Where you have been asked about a matter which has been addressed to some degree in your previous written evidence and you are clear that there is no further evidence which you can provide, please simply say so.

In the interests of fairness, you are also encouraged to provide, through the further written statement now being requested of you, any additional information that you can which is relevant to the Inquiry's investigation of the matters falling within its Terms of Reference in relation to any of its phases, in light of any additional matters which have emerged during the course of the Inquiry's evidence-gathering processes.

As the text of the Section 21 Notice explains, you are required by law to comply with it.

As before, it is vital that the further witness statement you provide to the Inquiry is your own evidence, absent the influence of others; that it is comprehensive; and that it fully explains your involvement in the matters about which you have been asked.

In the event that you require or desire access to some documentation, not already in your possession, in order to assist you in preparing your statement, please revert to me.

The questions in the attached notice refer to various documents. For the most part, these documents have already been provided to you or your solicitor. Where they have not, a copy of the relevant document is enclosed with the Notice.

I also remind you, as before, of the restriction orders made by the Chairman of the RHI Inquiry, which affect how you may deal with this correspondence and its enclosures (which are also provided to you under a duty of confidentiality to the RHI Inquiry). You may, of course, share the correspondence and the enclosed Notice and documents with your legal representative(s), under the same conditions as I set out in my previous correspondence.

Given the tight time-frame within which the RHI Inquiry must operate, the Chairman of the Inquiry would be grateful if you would comply with the requirements of the Section 21 Notice as soon as possible and, in any event, by the date set out for compliance in the Notice itself.

A copy of this correspondence has also been provided to your legal representative, Pádraig Ó'Muirigh (by email only).

Finally, I would be grateful if you could acknowledge receipt of this correspondence and the enclosed notice by email to Patrick.Butler@rhiinquiry.org.

Please do not hesitate to contact me to discuss any matter arising.

Yours faithfully

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Patrick Butler". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Patrick Butler

Solicitor to the RHI Inquiry

02890408928

SCHEDULE**[No 211 of 2018]***Your employment from 2014 to 2017*

1. Documents made available to the Inquiry on 12 October 2018 by you (**IND-41001 to 41019**) suggest that, from 6 May 2016, you were employed as an 'Administration and Research Manager' by Carál Ní Chuilín MLA in her capacity as an MLA. Your main duties are summarised at **IND-41012** and include, *inter alia*, 'to oversee the work of the MLA research team, contributing to the support and expertise and team management necessary for the effective running of the Sinn Fein Assembly operation' as well as 'primary responsibility for management of the internal assembly communications including the collation and distribution of appropriate reports/briefings to Sinn Fein MLA's [sic]'. You appear to have held a similar position ('Researcher Manager' – **IND-41013**) with similar duties (**IND-41019**) in the period from 20 February 2014 to 6 May 2016, albeit that the relevant contract records your employer as Sinn Fein rather than a particular MLA (**IND-41013**). In a witness statement dated 31 August 2018 (**WIT-161001 to 161063**), you described your role from March 2014 onwards in the following terms:

- a. **WIT-161023 – 1st paragraph**

In March 2014 I returned to work for Sinn Fein in the assembly team as the Administration and Research Manager, acting in support of the deputy First Minister. My specific duties included co-ordinating the Sinn Fein ministerial team, including the Special Advisers under the direction of the deputy First Minister. I was employed to do this by Sinn Fein and was not therefore employed as a Special Adviser from that point forward but as directed by the dFM, I worked to the same rules as those that applied to Special Advisers.

- b. **WIT-161024 – paragraph b**

As stated above my role was to support the dFM by co-ordinating the work of the Sinn Fein Executive team made up of Ministers, their advisers and key Sinn Fein Assembly policy advisers. I took my instructions and direction from the dFM

c. WIT-161024 – paragraph c

I co-ordinated and managed on a day to day basis the work of the advisers and wider SF Executive team under the authority and direction of the dFM through meetings, emails and phone calls as necessary,

Arising out of the above, please address the following issues:

- i. Clarify who was your employer in the period 20 February 2014 to 6 May 2016;
- ii. Clarify whether, during either or both of the periods (I) 20 February 2014 to 6 May 2016 and (II) 6 May 2016 to March 2017, your salary was met directly or indirectly, and either in whole or in part, from public funds (such as, for example, public funds available to Ms Ní Chuilín as an MLA), providing full details of the public funding (if applicable);
- iii. If no part of your salary during the said period was met either directly or indirectly from public funds, clarify the actual source of your salary;
- iv. Explain why, although employed as a Researcher Manager (from 2014) and as an Administration and Research Manager (from 2016) (pages **IND-41013** and **41012**, respectively, refer), your day to day role in fact appears to have involved the management and coordination of the Sinn Fein advisers and Ministers under the direction of the Deputy First Minister, (including in your answer

details of whether you were aware of the apparent difference between your job descriptions at IND-41019 and 41012 and your actual duties and whether Ms Ní Chuilín MLA, in fact, played any role in the day to day employment, management, supervision, direction or instruction of you);

- v. Provide any other evidence concerning your employment which you believe is relevant to the issues being investigated by the Inquiry under its Terms of Reference.

Generally

2. Finally, please provide any additional evidence which you consider to be relevant to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference, or of which you consider it should be aware, having regard to (a) any additional information and documentation which is now available to you, (b) your knowledge of the evidence of other parties in the Inquiry proceedings (in particular, evidence given since you provided your written statement to the Inquiry on 31 August 2018), and/or (c) any further developments or communications you have had with others.

NOTE:

It is important for the efficiency of the RHI Inquiry that the issues identified above are addressed as fully as possible and by reference, where available, to the dates and locations of specific incidents to which reference is made. The statement should be broken down into paragraphs, which should be numbered sequentially from '1' to the end. The use of appropriate section headings or sub-headings is also encouraged. A template witness statement is provided with this Notice for your assistance and should be used as the format for your response.



INQUIRY INTO THE RENEWABLE HEAT INCENTIVE SCHEME

RHI REF: Notice 211 of 2018

DATE:

Witness Statement of:

I, Aidan McAteer, will say as follows: -

Your employment from 2014 to 2017

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the Sinn Fein ministerial team, including the Special Advisers under the direction of the deputy First Minister. I was employed to do this by Sinn Fein and was not therefore employed as a Special Adviser from that point forward but as directed by the dFM, I worked to the same rules as those that applied to Special Advisers.

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As stated above my role was to support the dFM by co-ordinating the work of the Sinn Fein Executive team made up of Ministers, their advisers and key Sinn Fein Assembly policy advisers. I took my instructions and direction from the dFM

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I co-ordinated and managed on a day to day basis the work of the advisers and wider SF Executive team under the authority and direction of the dFM through meetings, emails and phone calls as necessary,

Arising out of the above, please address the following issues:

- i. Clarify who was your employer in the period 20 February 2014 to 6 May 2016;

Sinn Fein

- ii. Clarify whether, during either or both of the periods (I) 20 February 2014 to 6 May 2016 and (II) 6 May 2016 to March 2017, your salary was met directly or indirectly, and either in whole or in part, from public funds (such as, for example, public funds available to Ms Ní Chuilín as an MLA), providing full details of the public funding (if applicable);

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As far as I know my salary was paid through the Financial Assistance for Political Parties Scheme to carry out work related to the Assembly.

- iii. If no part of your salary during the said period was met either directly or indirectly from public funds, clarify the actual source of your salary;

Not applicable

- iv. Explain why, although employed as a Researcher Manager (from 2014) and as an Administration and Research Manager (from 2016) (pages **IND-41013 and 41012**, respectively, refer), your day to day role in fact appears to have involved the management and coordination of the Sinn Fein advisers and Ministers under the direction of the Deputy First Minister, (including in your answer details of whether you were aware of the apparent difference between your job descriptions at IND-41019 and 41012 and your actual duties and whether Ms Ní Chuilín MLA, in fact, played any role in the day to day employment, management, supervision, direction or instruction of you);

I had overall responsibility for oversight of the Sinn Fein Administration and Research teams in the Assembly. These teams worked effectively and efficiently and I reported on this and on any issues as they arose to the Party Whip. The work of the party Assembly and Executive teams were different they also overlapped and interacted on a daily basis.

My job description makes clear that the duties outlined are only an indication of my main duties and are not a comprehensive list. Martin McGuinness was the Sinn Fein leader in the Assembly and Executive I was more than happy and honoured to take on the role of co-ordinating the Sinn Fein Executive team in line with my job description.



I would also point out that the FAPP salary funded 37 hours work per week. Working with the deputy First minister involved much more work than that. The deputy first minister worked long hours, including weekends, and sometimes this amounted to well over 70 hours per week. I was happy to work alongside him and to invest my own personal time in the enormously important project of trying to make the political institution work.

- v. Provide any other evidence concerning your employment which you believe is relevant to the issues being investigated by the Inquiry under its Terms of Reference.

none

Generally

2. Finally, please provide any additional evidence which you consider to be relevant to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference, or of which you consider it should be aware, having regard to (a) any additional information and documentation which is now available to you, (b) your knowledge of the evidence of other parties in the Inquiry proceedings (in particular, evidence given since you provided your written statement to the Inquiry on 31 August 2018), and/or (c) any further developments or communications you have had with others.

There are a number of issue that I would like to address.

1. Record Keeping

Comments by the current acting Head of the Civil Service, David Sterling, around note-taking and freedom of Information requests have been widely reported and repeated in the media. I want to state categorically that no Sinn Fein Minister gave instructions



or suggested - implicitly or explicitly - that appropriate notes or records of decisions should not be taken. The taking of notes was the responsibility of civil servants and in my experience was fully complied with in departments under Sinn Fein Ministers. If any civil servant was in any doubt about this, this could have been raised with their respective minister. To my knowledge this never happened. Similarly, with FoI requests. Sinn Fein Ministers endeavoured to ensure full compliance with legislation and, in my role of co-ordinating the Sinn Fein Executive team, it was part of my responsibility to ensure that Sinn Fein Ministers and advisers complied with all their statutory responsibilities including those relating to freedom of information and transparency.

2. Whistle Blower

I provided evidence to the Inquiry about the HOCS briefing with the deputy first Minister on January 28 and the related issue of a whistle blower letter given to the First Minister sometime in January 2016, (according to her evidence) and subsequently passed to HOCS at the end of that month.

I would like to revisit this issue in the light of the evidence given by then HOCS, Malcolm McKibbin. While I was not at the briefing with the dFM on January 28, 2016, HOCS had already given me a summary of the issues. I do not recall any mention of a whistle blower communication in that brief conversation. Following his briefing with HOCS, I spoke to Martin McGuinness and he instructed me to work with the FM team to deliver the earliest possible closure of the scheme.

I am now aware that following the briefing HOCS office sent an email to the dFM's private secretary and to his adviser Mark Mullan. The next day this email was forwarded to me from another adviser Conor Heaney. By this stage I was already involved in the most intensive efforts to deliver the earliest possible closure of the scheme. I would like to make a number of points:

- 1. The briefings the dFM and I received from HOCS centred on the spike in applications in 2015 and the consequent pressure on the Executive budget. Mr McKibbin states clearly, in reference to his briefing with the dFM;*

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“.....the big picture for me wasn't the abuse letter, although important as it is; the big picture was the 33 million-plus hole in the budget”.

- II. *The deputy First Minister's response was to instruct that we pursue urgently the earliest possible closure of the RHI scheme.*
- III. *The abuse letter was emailed to me (and other members of the dFM team) after the appropriate action to investigate had already been taken by HOCS and did not therefore require any action by the dFM team. I know now that the communication was sent to me on 29 January. But it is clear from that email that it was for information only, that the allegations were already being properly pursued and that no action was requested or expected in response to the email. The email was sent to Mark Mullan and subsequently to Conor Heaney and then forwarded to me as the person dealing with the issue on the dFM's behalf, it is therefore unlikely that they would have taken any further action. I did not bring this to the attention of or discuss this with the dFM as the content of the email underlined the validity of his instruction that the scheme be closed as early as possible. My focus under the direction of the dFM was therefore on delivering the earliest possible closure of the scheme. Closure was the absolute priority.*
- IV. *The First Minister seems to have been aware of the identity of person who provided the 'anonymous' letter but appears not to have passed this important piece of information to HOCS as he refers to it as an 'anonymous'. This is an obvious and inexplicable omission. Furthermore, the FM did not deem the letter to be important enough to pass immediately to HOCS when she received it. In fact, it appears that the FM waited until HOCS initiated a discussion on RHI and asked to speak to her about the difficulties which he was becoming aware of, before she produced this letter to him. I am surprised that the FM did not instruct her own team - including the DUP Minister and adviser in DETI and other DUP advisers who had been directly involved in the RHI issue and who were aware of difficulties with the scheme – to investigate these allegations. This could have been carried out in parallel with asking HOCS to pass this communication to DETI – a Department which was under the stewardship of the DUP and under her own leadership as First Minister and DUP leader.*



This whistle blower information was passed personally to the FM, according to her own evidence, at some unspecified time in January 2016. It was not as has been suggested sent to both the FM and the dFM or to OFMDFM. The content was only shared with members of the dFM team after it had been passed to HOCS by the FM and had already been actioned by HOCS and, because it had already been actioned, this did not require any action on the part of the dFM team and was for information only. The communication was not given by the FM to the dFM despite the regularity of contact between them including on the morning of the 28th January 2016. It was obvious that the deputy First Minister became aware of RHI difficulties only when I informed him that HOCS wanted to brief him urgently about serious concerns and consequences for the Executive's finances emanating from two separate issues in DETI. This was in the late morning of January 28, 2016.

3. Two-week Closure Period

There have been some unsubstantiated allegations that the proposal for a two-week run-out period originated with, or was demanded by, Sinn Fein. This is not the case. While I cannot recall exactly when this time scale was first suggested, I know that the run-down period derived from the collective view in the FM and dFM offices that this was necessary to minimise the threat of legal challenge. The initial proposal to the First and deputy First Ministers from the DETI minister on February 5 was for a much longer run-out period to allow a public consultation exercise. This proposal from the DETI Minister was not acceptable and the agreed response from the FM and dFM sides was for immediate closure. When it became clear that immediate closure carried serious risks of a successful legal challenge, it was agreed that there would be the shortest run-out period possible to counter-balance the risk of legal challenge as is outlined in the HOCS minute of the 9 February, 2016, meeting. The specific proposal for two weeks would most likely have come from officials working in DETI who had knowledge of the scheme and how it operated. The period agreed was calculated, from memory, on an assessment of the installation time. This would go as far as possible to prevent new projects as

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they would be unable to meet this tight timeframe - but would allow those that had already invested significant sums in purchasing equipment to have that equipment installed and commissioned. There was no-one in the Sinn Fein team with the knowledge or expertise to make this assessment. The only plausible source of the two-week time frame was the department administering the scheme.

The suggestion that this two-week timeframe should have been costed is entirely valid in normal circumstances but in the context of the unfolding crisis it was necessary to make an urgent judgement on what would be regarded as a reasonable run-down period balanced against the risk that would have accompanied immediate or earlier closure. In other words, it was a decision based on the balance of risk and two weeks was judged to be the option that carried the least risk. Ultimately there was no legal challenge to closure.

The decisiveness of the deputy First Minister on this issue is itself a testament to his leadership and in stark contrast to the failures of the previous 7 months. The four-week time-frame from the briefing on January 28, 2016 when the issue was first brought to the attention of the deputy First minister and the successful closure of the scheme the following month is, in my experience of working in government, unprecedented, particularly given the need to bring the issue through the Assembly against the determined and trenchant efforts of other parties in the Assembly to keep this scheme open.

There was, however, no perfect approach in dealing with a scheme that was so fundamentally flawed. We were dealing then with the least bad option in bringing to an end a scheme that was flawed in its conception, construct and implementation.

As soon as the dFM was made aware of the financial implications of the flawed RHI scheme, he acted immediately to minimise the damage through the earliest possible closure of the entire scheme.



4. Party Political Advice to Ministers.

The issue of wider party and 'political' involvement in ministerial decision making has been raised a number of times by the Inquiry.

Government Ministers are members of, and appointed by, political parties. As such there is a balance to be struck between the Minister acting as an individual and as a party member. A Minister should not be completely cut off from their party, nor completely controlled by the party. Sinn Fein's approach is that Ministers make decisions and they do so with the benefit of the views, experience, and expertise of party members.

Under the Belfast Agreement and under sections 16, 18 and 19 of the NI Act, it is a condition of appointment that Ministers of the Northern Ireland Assembly, including the First Minister and the deputy First Minister and junior Ministers, affirm the terms of the Pledge of Office, which, in Section (ck) states:

*"to accept no authority, direction or control on my political activities other than my democratic mandate alongside my own personal and **party judgement**".
(emphasis added)*

Full consideration of party political policy in the formulation of departmental and wider government policy is therefore accepted and allowed for in the Ministerial Pledge of Office that all Minister are required to take and to which they are legally bound.

In line with this approach it was entirely appropriate for Sinn Fein Ministers and Special Advisors to liaise with party colleagues on the hugely important issue of RHI.

The Inquiry has highlighted the fact that some party members involved in those discussions were not elected to public office. Although the public will generally only be familiar with elected representatives the vast majority of members of all parties are not elected and therefore not well known to the general public. In Sinn Fein's case elected Ministers made decisions and they did so with the benefit of the advice of party members both elected and non-elected. Again, I believe this was entirely appropriate.

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Finally, media commentary has focussed on the fact that some members of Sinn Fein, including myself, were imprisoned during the conflict. There is nothing remarkable or untoward about former prisoners being involved in Sinn Fein. Many party members, both elected and non-elected, are former political prisoners who have played a key role in the peace process.

In any democratic system, governments and government ministers are politicians, in most cases members of a political party and elected on a political platform that they commit to implement as far as possible once elected to government. In essence, government is the ultimate outworking of electoral politics. Any political party in government will want to implement its manifesto commitments to its voters and will naturally be informed by the party political policy upon which they are elected to public office.

The reason that special advisers, essentially political advisers, are exempt from the civil service rules on political neutrality is to ensure that they can perform their role of bringing party political policy into play in the formulation of departmental and government policy by Ministers.

How much of those party political policies and priorities can be achieved in the context of other factors and realities is a judgement and often a negotiation for the relevant Minister or, in the case of more strategic or wider issues, the party leader in the administration, in our case the deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness.

The many crises faced by the Executive involving the regular rounds of negotiations centred on ideological differences between the DUP and Sinn Fein. For example, on two occasions the conflicting views within the administration on how to respond to the austerity and welfare cuts agenda imposed on the Executive by the British Conservative policy brought the Executive and Assembly to the brink of collapse. The approach of Sinn Fein in resisting welfare cuts and then in securing unique mitigations was an entirely political position taken by the deputy First Minister and in direct conflict with the position of the DUP and the natural and normal caution of civil servants. The Sinn Fein party political position as outlined in manifesto and policy positions is consistently protective of public services and in support for adequate social welfare



provision. This and the wider imperative of protecting the most vulnerable in society demanded that we take a politically assertive position on this issue. This, of course is the very purpose of electoral politics and is entirely compatible with the positions set out very clearly in the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers.

This is, of course, very different from the overt party political activity and functions - "use for party political purposes" - referred to in the code and which special advisers must properly avoid to comply with the code of conduct. Rather than ignoring or circumventing this requirement, part of my role as the coordinator of the Sinn Fein Executive team, and specifically the advisers, was to ensure full compliance with the code. If I had become aware of any advisers performing party functions rather than their designated roles as advisers I would have brought this immediately to the attention of the relevant Minister and, if necessary, the deputy First Minister. This never happened. In my extensive experience, no breaches of the code of conduct by advisers appointed by Sinn Fein Ministers were ever raised or brought to the attention of Sinn Fein Ministers.

5. Coordinating the Sinn Fein Executive Team

Martin McGuinness was the political leader of both the Sinn Fein Assembly and Executive teams. I, alongside all other Sinn Féin employees in the Assembly, worked under his direction. I had worked with Martin McGuinness in a variety of roles from the beginning of the peace process right through to his appointment as deputy First Minister in 2007. There was the highest level of trust and respect between us. When I returned to work in the Assembly it was, in large measure as a result of the high respect and admiration I held for Mr McGuinness and in line with his very clear personal commitment to making the political institutions work effectively for the people they served. I fully and unreservedly shared this commitment.

On returning to work in the Assembly in the spring of 2014, Martin McGuinness asked me to take on the responsibility of coordinating on a day to day basis the Sinn Fein Ministerial and adviser team and liaising with the FM team to ensure that the Executive - and consequently the Assembly - functioned effectively in the interests of our wider society. I was more than content to do so.

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Even had I not been required to take on additional responsibilities as set out in my job description, I would have willingly taken on this additional work at his request. In performing this aspect of work, I want to make it absolutely clear that the only party political input to my role was my appointment. I did not take instruction or direction from the Sinn Fein party. I took instruction and direction solely and only from Martin McGuinness, and, in respect of the Executive team, specifically in his role as deputy First Minister. In performing this role my responsibility was to co-ordinate the work of the Sinn Fein Ministers, to act as the primary and on-going liaison with the First ministers advisers and, by doing so, to bring maximum cohesion and stability to the Executive and the Assembly in a context of deep and on-going political differences and divisions.

I did not direct or instruct anyone to act in a way that conflicted with their own responsibilities in terms of the Ministerial Code or the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers. Advisers to Sinn Fein Ministers acted, and were required to act, at all times within the rules governing their conduct and it was part of my responsibility to ensure that this was the case.

My status as a party appointee was well known within the government system both at civil service and political level. Despite the deep political divisions and at times open hostility between the DUP and Sinn Féin, the issue of my role and position was never raised or presented as a problem. On the contrary, as has been outlined in evidence to this Inquiry by the former head of the Civil service, Malcolm McKibbin:

"If you take it that Martin McGuinness, deputy First minister, had an obligation to serve in the interests of the public and of the administration, if Aidan McAteer is under – working underneath his direction and authority, you would assume that Aidan was doing the same." I would assert that this is the basis on which the senior civil service, the DUP and others interacted with me. My employment status was never an issue and was never raised as an issue. One would assume that over the years I performed this role, had there been any issue or criticisms that people paid from public funds were being used inappropriately or for narrow or specific party political purposes, that this would have been raised with the former head of the Civil Service, Sir Malcolm McKibbin. This was never the case as has been confirmed by Sir Malcolm in his evidence.



6. The 2013 Act

Finally, it has been suggested that my appointment was made to deliberately and consciously breach the 2013 Act. This is not the case. I was asked to take on a specific responsibility based on a long-standing working relationship with Martin McGuinness and his view that my experience would contribute to the more effective and efficient running of government. Working at all times within the law, rules and codes, Sinn Fein employed me from resources allocated to the party to ensure that I could fulfil the role that the deputy First Minister had asked me to do. This also meant that the discriminatory effects of the act did not prevent me bringing my experience to the important work of the Executive or preclude me, as a former political prisoner, from participating fully in the political process or in assisting the deputy First Minister in the challenging work as joint leader in an involuntary coalition government. I was always very open and clear about my status as a party employee and my background as a political prisoner. Former political prisoners have played key roles in creating and advancing the peace process, in the Good Friday Agreement negotiations and in the political institutions that it created. Many former political prisoners have worked effectively and consistently to make the political institutions work effectively. The deputy First Minister, other Sinn Fein Ministers and many MLAs were also former political prisoners who worked tirelessly in the interests of the public and the administration in attempting to build a better, more accountable and more just society for all our people.

NOTE:

It is important for the efficiency of the RHI Inquiry that the issues identified above are addressed as fully as possible and by reference, where available, to the dates and locations of specific incidents to which reference is made. The statement should be broken down into paragraphs, which should be numbered sequentially from '1' to the



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end. The use of appropriate section headings or sub-headings is also encouraged. A template witness statement is provided with this Notice for your assistance and should be used as the format for your response.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed:  _____

Dated: 21/11/18